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ABSTRACT
Based on conflicting Federal Circuit case law, many academics have
written, and many practitioners likely believe, that claim meanings or
their applications may expand over time for purposes of literal
infringement. But this common wisdom is wrong. Under existing Federal
Circuit rules, the first precedent controls in the event of a conflict over
doctrine, unless and until reversed en banc. The first precedent on the
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issue, the 2000 Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc. case, held that claim scope
does not reach after-arising technologies for literal infringement and
suggested that if it did, then such claims would lack written description
support. Under existing validity precedents, temporally expanding claim
scope would violate both § 112(a)’s enablement and written description
requirements, as explicitly held in the 1977 In re Hogan decision and as
implied by the more recent 2010 Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly & Co.
en banc decision. Further, were claims able to expand over time for literal
infringement, they would violate the axiomatic equivalency of claim scope
for validity and infringement. Once it is recognized that claim scope for
literal infringement does not protect against after-arising technologies,
further resort will be made to seek such protection under the doctrine of
equivalents. This not only highlights the importance of the Ariad
Pharmaceuticals decision but also will cause a big change to current
practices and will lead to increased uncertainty regarding the scope of
patent protection.
This Article explains why academics and practitioners may be
confused regarding the U.S. law of literal infringement’s temporal scope.
It describes the conflicting cases that have led to that confusion. And it
explains why § 112(f)’s rule of construction for functional claiming
language may be understood to limit all claim scope to temporally fixed,
known-to-be equivalent technologies. This Article concludes by noting
potential conflict with the pioneering invention doctrine and concerns
should the law be changed to permit claiming the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
The modern “doctrine of equivalents” protects patent holders from
infringement by after-arising technologies (also referred to as later-arising
technologies) deemed factually equivalent to technologies known to be
claim embodiments as of the effective filing date of claims. As the
Supreme Court held in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo, Kabushiki
Co., Ltd., 1 where “[t]he equivalent [to embodiments of the construed
claim language] may have been unforeseeable at the time of the
application,” a presumptive prosecution history estoppel created by
adopting a narrowing claim amendment will not bar a finding of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 2
But that leaves an important question unaddressed. That question is
whether, for purposes of so-called “literal” infringement, interpreted
1.
2.

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002).
Id. at 741 (emphasis added).
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claim meaning and the application of such meaning: (1) may expand over
time to encompass such after-arising, equivalent technologies; or (2) must
remain fixed in time and excludes such technologies from being
considered claim embodiments. 3 If claim meaning or the scope of
application of such meaning can expand over time for literal infringement
purposes, then there is less need to resort to the doctrine of equivalents to
protect against after-arising technologies. However, if claim meaning or
application scope is limited to technologies that were known as of the
filing date to be claim embodiments, then the doctrine of equivalents is
necessary for any such protection.
As stated in 2000 by former Chief Judge Rader of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) in his en banc
concurrence in the Festo case prior to the Supreme Court’s decision:
A primary justification for the doctrine of equivalents is to accommodate
such unforeseeable, after-arising technology. Without a doctrine of
equivalents, any claim drafted in current technological terms could be
easily circumvented after the advent of an advance in technology. . . .
Fortunately, the doctrine of equivalents accommodates that
unforeseeable dilemma for claim drafters. 4

Judge Rader’s discussion implicitly suggests that literal claim meaning
and application scope is limited to equivalent known-to-be embodiments
at the time of application filing. It also implicitly suggests that the doctrine
of equivalents protects against after-arising technologies that could not
validly be claimed under the written description doctrine. After-arising
technologies are unforeseeable and therefore are not subjectively
“possessed” by the applicant (nor objectively disclosed for skilled artisans
to “visualize or recognize”) as of the filing date. 5
Nevertheless, I believe that Judge Rader’s view is not the common
wisdom. Rather, many academic writers state, and practitioners likely
assume, that under current U.S. patent law, claim meaning or claim
application scope may permissibly expand over time for literal
infringement purposes. In doing so, claims may encompass after-arising
technologies that were unforeseeable at the time of filing an application,
i.e., not constructively recognized as claim embodiments by skilled
3. See generally Kevin E. Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising
Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493 (2008).
4. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 619 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (Rader, J., concurring), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
5. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Cf. id. at 1352 (“[A] description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the
requirement.”).
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practitioners. I believe that this common wisdom is wrong, even if there
are good reasons (from conflicting case holdings) why the common
wisdom is thought to be the current law. 6
The reason that I believe that the common wisdom is wrong is the
failure to recognize and apply the Federal Circuit’s rule regarding
controlling precedent. That rule requires that an earlier-in-time panel
precedent controls in the event of a conflict over doctrine, unless and until
the Federal Circuit goes en banc to reverse that earlier precedent.7 Given
the absence of clear Supreme Court precedent or en banc precedent on the
issue of literal infringement by after-arising technologies, the earliest
panel precedent controls. And the earliest precedent on the issue, Schering
Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 8 limits the temporal meaning and scope of
application for literal infringement purposes to equivalent technologies
known to be embodiments of the claim language as of effective filing date
of the claim. 9
Further, a holding that claim meaning may permissibly expand over
time for literal infringement purposes so as to capture such after-arising
technologies would violate the “axiomatic” equivalency of claim scope
for purposes of validity and infringement. 10 Claim meaning and
6. In fact, I made the same mistaken assumption in prior work, relying on conflicting
decisions to suggest that claim meaning should be understood to be fixed as of the filing date, but that
claim application scope may expand over time. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Doctrine of Equivalents
and Claiming the Future after Festo, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 403, 428–32 (2004) (citing and discussing
Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004), SuperGuide Corp. v.
DirectTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb
Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Cf. id. at 432 n.147, 434 n.162 (discussing
Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000), without recognizing that it controls
the issue).
7. See, e.g., Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(en banc). Cf. Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (Nies, J., dissenting) (“A panel decision cannot overturn any precedential ruling of the court,
even of a prior panel, much less that of an in banc court. See, e.g., Capital Elec., Inc. v. United States,
729 F.2d 743, 746 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (only court sitting in banc can overrule an earlier panel
decision).”).
8. Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
9. See id. at 1351–53.
10. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing
W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). See, e.g.,
SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing W.L.
Gore & Assocs., 842 F.2d at 1279, Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1449
(Fed. Cir. 1984), and Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967)). See
also Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Because
the claims of a patent measure the invention at issue, the claims must be interpreted and given the
same meaning for purposes of both validity and infringement analyses.”). Cf. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz,
Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“It has been an inviolate rule
that patent claims are construed the same way for validity and for infringement.”) (citing cases).
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application scope have long been limited to known embodiments of claim
meaning as of the filing date for validity purposes under enablement cases.
Patent specifications could not enable such temporally expanding claim
meanings or application scope, as held In re Hogan, 11 a seminal 1977
precedent of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (whose precedents
were adopted along with Court of Claims precedents as binding Federal
Circuit precedents). 12 The same premises also apply under the written
description doctrine cases. The specifications for such claims could not
demonstrate that the applicant “possessed” the full scope of the claims as
of the filing date, under the 2010 en banc holding in Ariad
Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly & Co. 13
Thus, if claim meaning or application scope was construed to
encompass after-arising technologies, the claim would necessarily be
invalid. The Schering precedent assures that literal infringement claim
meaning and application scope are co-extensive with validity claim
meaning and application scope and, consequently, that claims are not
invalidated on this basis. Conversely, any claims construed for literal
infringement that would extend to after-arising technology should be held
invalid, and thus would be incapable of being literally infringed. This
highlights the importance of the Ariad Pharmaceuticals decision, as it not
only limits claim scope but also precludes claims from being infringed by
after-arising technologies.
Recognizing that literal infringement scope does not protect against
any after-arising equivalent technologies, however, will result in
substantial changes to existing patent practices. Insubstantial but
subsequent changes to existing technologies, such as in software, will then
be recognized as incapable of literally infringing. In particular, the
recognition will generate even greater pressure to resort to the doctrine of
equivalents to achieve such protection, and will generate greater
procedural complexity and uncertainty regarding the scope of patent
protection. This will pose even more starkly the concerns with relying on
the doctrine of equivalents that were expressed by Lord Hoffmann in
2004, well before the recent change in United Kingdom (U.K.) law to
11. See In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 604 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (limiting claim meaning for
enablement doctrine to the meaning and claim embodiments recognized at the time of filing to avoid
having later, unforeseeable technological developments invalidate claims); S. Corp. v. United States,
690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
12. S. Corp., 690 F.2d at 1370 (adopting as precedents holdings of the Court of Claims and of
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals prior to October 1, 1982).
13. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming
the written description adequacy test of an objective disclosure of subjective mental “possession” of
the full scope of claimed subject matter).
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adopt a doctrine of equivalents 14 and to restrict reliance on so-called
“purposive interpretation” 15 for literal infringement determinations. As
Lord Hoffmann noted earlier when rejecting the doctrine of equivalents,
“once the monopoly ha[s] been allowed to escape from the terms of the
claims, it is not easy to know where its limits should be drawn.” 16 And as
Lord Hoffmann further noted by comparison, “American patent litigants
[will] pay dearly for results which are no more just or predictable than
could be achieved by simply reading the claims.” 17
The understanding that literal infringement scope does not reach
after-arising technologies also does not conflict with the doctrine of
equivalents holding of the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co. 18 In regard to what is now § 112(f), 19 WarnerJenkinson held that when Congress adopted a special interpretive rule for
claim terms employing functional language, Congress did not thereby
foreclose a doctrine of equivalents that provides protection beyond the
scope of application of construed claim meaning. 20 But prohibiting literal
14. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis UK Ltd. [2017] UKSC 48, [54].
15. See Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd. [1982] RPC 183, 184; Improver Corp.
v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd. [1990] F.S.R. 181; Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel
Ltd. [2004] UKHL 46. Cf. Katherine Stephens, Actavis v Lilly – A Year After the Revolution, in ICLG
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL GUIDE TO PATENTS 2019 4 (9th ed. 2019) (“In Generics v. Yeda, in the
first decision to be handed down after Actavis, Arnold J was emphatically of the opinion that the law
remained that a patent claim should be given a purposive and not a literal construction.”). See
generally Paul England, The scope of protection of patent claims in Europe and the UPC, 11 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 689, 690–91 (2016) (describing purposive interpretation in the U.K.).
16. Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46, [39].
17. Id. at [44]. See Paul Cole, Letter to the Editor, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 642,
643 (2005) (“However, according to Lord Hoffmann, what courts can do is to give the claim language
an extended meaning. . . . Furthermore, construction of claims to cover new technology is clearly
permissible.”). Cf. Sarnoff, supra note 6 at 1157 (2004) (“As under the European Patent Convention,
any residual fairness concerns would be addressed better by nonliterally interpreting claim language
than by applying the modern doctrine of equivalents.”). See generally Alexandra K. Pechtold, The
Evolution of the Doctrine of Equivalents in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany, 87 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 412 (2005).
18. See generally Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2018).
20. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27–28 (“Because § 112, ¶ 6, was enacted as a targeted
cure to a specific problem, and because the reference in that provision to ‘equivalents’ appears to be
no more than a prophylactic against potential side effects of that cure, such limited congressional
action should not be overread for negative implications. Congress in 1952 could easily have
responded to Graver Tank as it did to the Halliburton decision. But it did not.”) (citing Graver Tank
& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) and Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v.
Walker, 321 U.S. 1 (1946)). I have argued elsewhere that Congress also did not impliedly ratify
Graver Tank’s creation of a doctrine of equivalents extending protection beyond the scope of
application of construed claim language. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines
of Equivalence and Claiming the Future: Part II (1870-1950), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
441, 483–90 (2005) [hereinafter Sarnoff, DOE Part II]. Thus, courts remain free to restore the doctrine
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claim meaning and application scope from applying to after-arising
technologies may raise concerns regarding a possible conflict with the
pioneering invention (or pioneering patent) doctrine. That doctrine was
based on the lack of prior art to restrict claim meaning and application
scope that would otherwise invalidate broad claims. 21 But the pioneering
invention doctrine could be understood to authorize the use of broad
claiming language that is intended to (or that may be construed to) apply
literally to after-arising technology that was not earlier recognized as a
claim embodiment. It is unclear whether the pioneering invention doctrine
remains in force (and In re Hogan did not ultimately reach that issue22);
if it permits claiming after-arising technology, it would then break the
axiomatic equivalency of claim scope for validity and literal infringement.
To the extent that such future-regarding claiming language is authorized
explicitly or by construction of language that has no temporal limitation,
such claims under current law would clearly reach beyond the scope of
the disclosed invention enabled at the time of filing and “possessed” by
the applicant. 23 Such claims should thus be invalid under current validity

to its historic role of defining the scope of claim application however broadly or narrowly, literally or
liberally, the claim language is construed. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines
of Equivalence and Claiming the Future, Part I (1790-1870), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
371, 391–97 (2005).
21. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2018); Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
805 F.2d 1558 (1986), reh’g denied, 846 F.2d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (arguing that the “liberal”
construction of pioneering invention claims “is not a manifestation of a different legal standard based
on an abstract legal concept denominated ‘pioneer.’ Rather, the ‘liberal’ view flows directly from the
relative sparseness of prior art in nascent fields of technology.”) (quoting Morley Sewing Mach. Co.
v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 286 (1889)). See also Brothers v. United States, 250 U.S. 88, 89 (1919);
McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. 402, 404–08 (20 How. 1857).
22. See, e.g., In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“Though we do not reach the
point on this appeal, we note appellants’ argument that their invention is of ‘pioneer’ status.”); Brian
J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 382–83 (2012) (discussing
Tex. Instruments, Inc. and the “[c]onventional wisdom . . . that the [pioneering invention patent]
doctrine was killed more than twenty years ago.”); John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent
Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 52 (1995) (“[I]n one sense the doctrine of
equivalents remedies the anomaly in the law that exists whenever a pioneer patent is not literally
infringed by the very subject matter which was spawned by the disclosure of that pioneer patent.”).
Cf. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 610 (Miller, J., concurring) (“Contrary to the majority opinion, to permit the
‘outer boundaries’ of a claim to be construed in light of later art, rather than in light of art at the time
the patent application was filed, could well impede progress in the useful arts.”).
23. See authority cited supra note 13 and accompanying text. Cf. Love, supra note 22, at 384
(assuming the expansion of claim meaning over time, either by construction or reissue; “claims [for
pioneer inventions] will naturally expand with time as technical terminology evolves and hindsight
bias takes effect.”); Sarnoff, supra note 6, at 1157 (“The Supreme Court or Congress also may need
to impose additional limits on the ability to claim later-arising technologies for patent law to serve its
constitutional purpose of promoting progress.”).
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doctrines, unless the axiomatic equivalency of validity and literal
infringement scope is to be broken.
Resolving these tensions will require rethinking (at some point) the
permissible scope of claiming and the role of the doctrine of equivalents
and the pioneering invention doctrine. 24 This Article, however, simply
emphasizes that the best understanding of the current law in the U.S. is
that claims may not apply to after-arising technologies for literal
infringement purposes. Claims employing language that expressly seeks
to cover future but constructively unknown embodiments should be held
invalid as lacking both enablement and written description support, and
thus cannot be infringed. And under current claim construction doctrine,
claim language that is ambiguous regarding such future application scope
should be construed not to encompass after-arising technology so as to
preserve claim validity. 25 Thus, we may be stuck for the foreseeable future
in the U.S. with the doctrine of equivalents as the sole means to provide
protection for after-arising equivalent technologies. And other countries
including the U.K. now face the same questions. 26
In Part II, I discuss the common (but not universal) wisdom that
claim meaning and application scope permissibly may expand to cover
after-arising technology for literal infringement purposes. I demonstrate
that the common wisdom is based on conflicting Federal Circuit
precedents that fail to follow the earliest panel precedent Schering. The
goal is to bring the conflicts to light, so that a proper understanding of the
current law may be applied or, alternatively, the law may be changed.

24. Compare, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 6, at 1213 (“[I]f any additional protection beyond the
scope of application of the literal meaning of claim limitations were thought to be necessary, nonliteral
claim construction should be a preferable alternative to the modern doctrine. . . . The facts of the Festo
case provide a concrete example of why literal interpretation should be preferred, and why nonliteral
interpretation would be a better alternative than the modern doctrine to remedy (mistakenly) perceived
unfairness.”), with England, supra note 15, at 697 (applicants “cannot be expected to predict what
future technological developments might be made. . . . However, in practice, despite the above
recognition of a doctrine of equivalents, many courts have to a large degree moved towards an
approach that places claim language at the center of the infringement analysis and in which the
application of the doctrine of equivalents is something of a last resort to avoid an inequitable result.”).
25. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“While
we have acknowledged the maxim that claims should be construed to preserve their validity, we have
not applied that principle broadly” where “the claim term at issue is not ambiguous.”) (citing Klein
v. Russell, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 433, 466 (1873)).
26. I am, however, now more sympathetic to the temporal limitation problem that, at its core,
the modern doctrine of equivalents addresses. My increased sympathy for the doctrine of equivalents
may provide a useful lesson about, if not an antidote to, the increasing pressures for and tendencies
of (particularly younger) scholars to publish more frequently and quickly, without taking adequate
time to really learn the entire history and without spending even more time and effort—rather than
less and less—to fully consider that history and how their proposals relate to it.
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In Part III, I explain why, as the earliest panel precedent, the Schering
case controls the current doctrine and, therefore, why claims may not
apply to after-arising technologies for literal infringement purposes.
Schering clearly held that literal claim meaning and application scope
cannot extend to after-arising technologies, while also suggesting that
claims would be invalid as lacking written description support if they did.
I also discuss in more detail the critical precedents that followed Schering,
some of which generated the conflicting views discussed in Part II without
even citing Schering, much less attempting to distinguish its precedent.
But even if these later cases were somehow thought to control the issue of
literal infringement by after-arising technologies, then such claims should
simply be held invalid under the en banc Ariad Pharmaceuticals written
description precedent, and thus would be incapable of being infringed.
In Part IV, I briefly explain why Congress in 1952 may be thought
to have precluded claim language from applying to after-arising
technologies for literal infringement purposes. Specifically, in the
predecessor to § 112(f), Congress mandated a specific interpretive rule for
functional claiming language. 27 That rule has been interpreted by the
Federal Circuit for literal infringement purposes to temporally limit claim
scope to technologies known-to-be equivalent to disclosed claim
embodiments as of the filing date and that perform the identical function
claimed. 28 Although structural claiming language is not formally subject
to the interpretive rule of § 112(f), the failure to temporally limit structural
claim term meanings to temporally fixed embodiments then requires
functional determinations to assess the scope of application of such
structural meanings. 29 Thus, permitting structural claim meaning and
application scope to apply to equivalent after-arising technologies that
were not constructively recognized by skilled persons to be claim
embodiments by the filing date effectively converts structural claiming
language into functional claiming language. And then, such structural
claiming language should be subject to the same § 112(f) temporal
limitation rule for literal infringement that currently applies to explicitly
functional claiming language. 30
27. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2018).
28. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
29. Cf. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relevant
portion en banc) (discussing purportedly structural terms that require determination of whether
allegedly infringing things “perform[] a specified function”); id. at 1351 (“[T]he fact that one of skill
in the art could program a computer to perform the recited functions cannot create structure where
none otherwise is disclosed.”).
30. See, e.g., id. at 1349–51 (discussing “nonce words”).
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II. CONFUSION OVER WHETHER LITERAL INFRINGEMENT CLAIM
MEANING OR APPLICATION SCOPE MAY EXPAND OVER TIME TO AFTERARISING TECHNOLOGIES.
As Professor Donald Chisum put it in his leading treatise, “[t]he time
framework for construing patent claims is the subject of surprisingly
sparse judicial authority.” 31 Yet many practical treatises and academic
works indicate that claim meaning (or the scope of application of that
meaning) either (1) may expand over time to encompass after-arising
technologies for literal infringement purposes or (2) may not do so. They
arrived at those conclusions based on conflicting case law. This is true
even though the courts and commentators uniformly treat claim meaning
and application scope as temporally fixed for validity purposes.
In regard to validity, Professor Chisum noted one decision of the
Supreme Court that focused on the filing date for definiteness and noted
various decisions of the Federal Circuit alternatively focusing on the filing
date or the date of invention. 32 Specifically, in Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 33 the Supreme Court stated that “[d]efiniteness is
measured from the viewpoint of a person skilled in [the] art at the time the
patent was filed.” 34 In discussing this decision, Professor Chisum noted:
The Court was not addressing the issue of the filing date versus the
invention date. Rather, the Court was rejecting the position that claim
definiteness could be assessed from a later, post-filing date, claimconstruction perspective. However, because definiteness is closely
linked to claim construction, the Nautilus statement tended to support
the view that the filing date should control. 35

When reviewing earlier Federal Circuit validity decisions in regard
to the timing of claim construction and application scope, Professor
Chisum concluded:
The enablement and written disclosure requirements [particularly In re
Hogan], which provide essential support for a patent’s claims, are
measured according to the patent’s effective application filing date. It
would seem to follow that, to the extent that the meaning of a patent
claim depends on the state of the art or on tests, standards or
measurements established in the art, the time framework should be the

31.

5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03(2)(g) (2020) [hereinafter CHISUM
(discussing “Time Framework”).
See, e.g., id.
Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898 (2014).
Id. at 908 (citations omitted).
CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 31, at § 18.03(2)(g).

ON PATENTS]

32.
33.
34.
35.
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filing date. Nevertheless, Federal Circuit decisions have stated, without
analysis, that the relevant date is the date of invention, which is only
presumed to be the application filing date. 36

In contrast, when discussing the temporal frame for literal
infringement claim meaning and application scope, Professor Chisum did
not draw any clear conclusions but simply described the various Federal
Circuit cases and their holdings. 37 Professor Chisum started by describing
Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 38 and then discussed subsequent cases
such as Kopykake Enterprises, Inc. v. Lucks Co.39 and SuperGuide Corp.
v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc. 40 He also discussed in footnotes various
additional cases, such as Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics
Corp., 41 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 42 and Innogenetics, N.V. v.
Abbott Laboratories. 43
These cases, however, reached different results in regard to whether
claim meaning or application scope for literal infringement purposes can
apply to after-arising technologies. For example, in Kopykake
Enterprises, the court relied upon Schering to hold that “when a claim
term understood to have a narrow meaning when the application is filed
later acquires a broader definition, the literal scope of the term is limited
to what it was understood to mean at the time of filing.” 44 In contrast, in
Innogenetics, N.V., the court relied upon Superguide to hold that “[o]ur
case law allows for after-arising technology to be captured within the
literal scope of valid claims that are drafted broadly enough.” 45

36. Id.
37. However, in a separate section on adequacy of disclosure, Professor Chisum notes that
“[t]he state of the art as of the filing date is used to determine whether the scope of a claim is
commensurate with the scope of the disclosure in the specification.” 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra
note 31, at § 7.03(3)(a)(ii). Professor Chisum also discusses there various timing cases, including In
re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977), Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315
F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 31, at § 7.03(3)(a)(ii). See id. (noting that the Federal Circuit in
Plant Genetic Systems rejected the argument that “‘pioneer’ status would entitle a patent to a ‘lower
enablement requirement’” that would justify broad claims without sufficient disclosure).
38. Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
39. Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
40. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
41. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
42. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
43. Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See also CHISUM ON
PATENTS, supra note 31, at § 18.03(2)(g).
44. Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1337, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Schering
Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1352–54 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
45. Innogenetics, N.V., 512 F.3d at 1371–72 (quoting SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters.,
Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 878–80 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
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Although Professor Chisum did not discuss in this context the
seminal, en banc Phillips v. AWH Corp. 46 literal infringement claim
construction methodology case, the Federal Circuit held in that case that
claims should receive their “ordinary and customary” meaning for literal
infringement purposes; that meaning “is the meaning that the term would
have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the
invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.”47
As with the Supreme Court in Nautilus, however, the Federal Circuit in
Phillips was not focused on the distinction of an earlier invention date
from the filing date but rather on concerns for an excessive scope by
relying on dictionary definitions that might include inappropriately broad
(including later-developed) meanings. 48
The Phillips language and the conflicts among these cases are all the
more remarkable given that, as Professor Chisum noted, in cases such as
“PC Connector Solutions LLC v. SmartDisk Corp. (2005), 49 the Federal
Circuit emphasized that ‘[a] claim cannot have different meanings at
different times.’ . . . [I]ts meaning must be interpreted as of its effective
filing date.” 50 Further, the court in PC Connector Solutions cited to
another important en banc Federal Circuit decision on claim construction
for literal infringement, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 51
Markman similarly referred to what a skilled artisan would understand the
claim term to mean “at the time of the invention.” 52 Nevertheless, nothing
in the en banc Phillips and Markman decisions therefore suggests that
claim meaning or application scope encompasses technologies arising
after the effective filing date of the relevant claim language.
In contrast to Professor Chisum, in 2005 Professor Mark Lemley (in
an important article cited by Chisum) directly addressed the changing
temporal reference frame sometimes given to claim term meanings by the

46. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
47. Id. at 1312–13 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) and citing Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111,
1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). Cf. Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1116 (“A court
construing a patent claim seeks to accord a claim the meaning it would have to a person of ordinary
skill in the art at the time of the invention.”) (emphasis added).
48. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 (“The main problem with elevating the dictionary to such
prominence is that it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words rather than on the meaning
of claim terms within the context of the patent.”). Cf. CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 31, at
§ 18.03(2)(g).
49. PC Connector Sols. LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
50. CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 31, at § 18.03(2)(g) (quoting PC Connector Sols., 406
F.3d at 1363).
51. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
52. PC Connector Sols., 406 F.3d at 1363 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 986).
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Federal Circuit. 53 As usual, Professor Lemley cogently summarized the
common wisdom that had developed by that time regarding temporally
expanding claim meaning for literal infringement purposes. And
Professor Lemley stated, based on the case law, such changing temporal
meanings may sometimes include after-arising technologies as claim
embodiments for literal infringement purposes:
It is a fundamental principle of patent law that the time as of which we
determine the meaning of claim terms varies depending on what legal
rule is at issue. . . . And where the question involves alleged
infringement of the patent, courts evaluate infringement in at least some
circumstances based on the meaning of the claim at the time of
infringement. 54

Similarly, the leading patent law textbook authors, Professors Robert
Merges and John Duffy, have explained that for literal infringement
purposes courts do not fix the meaning of claim terms as of the filing date,
but rather as of the time of infringement. 55 In explaining how
improvement patents for non-obvious after-arising technologies can
infringe without rendering the underlying patent invalid for lack of
enablement, the authors noted that although:
the enablement inquiry is forever pegged to the time of application
filing . . . for purposes of infringement, however, the coverage of the
claim is determined at the time of the alleged infringement. . . . For
infringement purposes, the phrase will be interpreted as of a later date.
If the improvement is a “fuzzball” as the term was understood at that
later date, then it infringes. 56

The textbook authors justify the differential treatment of claim term
meanings as fixed for enablement and as expanding over time for
infringement based on seminal theoretical work addressing after-arising

53. See CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 31, at § 18.03(2)(g) n.961 (citing Mark A. Lemley,
The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2005)).
54. Lemley, supra note 53, at 102–03 (last emphasis in original). See also id. at 108 n.31
(discussing Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1974)). Cf. id. at
104 n.12, 116 n.59, 118 n.72 (identifying the Schering case in three footnotes without expanding on
the decision in detail); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1757 (2009) (citing and discussing Chiron Corp. v.
Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004) and SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters.,
Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2004), without citing Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2000)).
55. See generally ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2017).
56. Id. at 274–75 (emphasis added).
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technology by Professor Kevin Collins. 57 Collins’s work is well worth
reading on its own, but for present purposes regarding common beliefs
about the state of the law, Professor Merges and Duffy summarize
Collins’s approach as follows:
According to Collins, claim meaning for purposes of enablement is
defined with reference to all those possible embodiments defined by the
claims on the patent’s filing date. For these purposes, claim meaning
involves a mapping between the words of the claim and a class of actual,
physical objects. This type of meaning is known as denotational
meaning. By contrast, for purposes of infringement meaning is better
described in terms of relationships among words. Meaning establishes a
stable matrix of concepts that clarifies where one word stands with
respect to other words; this type of meaning is called ideational meaning.
The distinction between denotational meaning is fixed with respect to
physical embodiments (or things in the world), while ideational meaning
is not. . . . For purposes of enablement, meaning has a fixed, temporal
aspect, defined by things in the world on the date the meaning is fixed.
For infringement, meaning is not fixed in this way. Things that are
described by words may change without the meaning of the word itself
changing. Meaning for enablement is time-dependent . . . meaning for
infringement is not (it is independent of the number and type of things
in the world at a given time). 58

Just prior to Collins’s work, in 2004, I explained why I thought that
the courts had failed to recognize that temporally fixed meanings might
have different temporal scopes of application (embodiment scopes), as a
result of increasing knowledge in the art regarding what things in the
world met that fixed meaning. I also analyzed the various relevant and
conflicting cases to explain that the Federal Circuit had alternately held
that claim meaning may expand over time for infringement scope so as to
apply to after-arising technologies, and that claim meaning may not
expand over time for infringement scope. 59 And although I mentioned the
57. See Collins, supra note 3.
58. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 55, at 275–77. Cf. Joshua D. Sarnoff & Edward D. Manzo,
An Introduction to, Premises of, and Problems With Patent Claim Construction, in PATENT CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1.4 n.20 (E. Manzo ed. 2019) (“[T]he level of generality
(or ‘granularity’) matters to what is considered equivalent, and the scope of things encompassed by a
temporally fixed meaning may actually expand over time (depending on the type of linguistic meaning
referred to—’ideational’ meaning or ‘denotational’ meaning—that is considered to be fixed.”) (citing
Collins, supra note 3, at 500). But cf. infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text (discussing
intentional and extensional definitions of the meaning of terms).
59. See Sarnoff, supra note 6, at 428–32 (citing and discussing Chiron Corp., 363 F.3d at 1257,
SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and Plant Genetic
Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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Schering precedent in the context of claim amendments and changing
application scope, I did not then explain why I believed that Schering
controlled the issue (as the earliest panel precedent) and precluded literal
infringement from encompassing after-arising technologies. 60
In contrast, in 2005, Professor Christopher Cotropia relied upon
Schering to suggest that claim meaning and application scope may not
expand over time for literal infringement purposes to encompass afterarising technologies. As he stated:
[t]he court in Hogan did not specifically hold that claim language can
literally include after-arising technologies. In fact, the weight of Federal
Circuit authority indicates the opposite, as discussed above and
exemplified by the Schering decision. Thus, recent case law has
emphasized the temporal limitation on literal claim meaning, prohibiting
the literal capture of later-developed technologies. 61

In summary, the academic literature and court cases are in conflict
over the ability of claim meaning or application scope to expand over time
for purposes of literal infringement. This is true even though the cases
generally establish both a fixed temporal meaning and application scope
for validity purposes, and even though many cases explicitly state that
claim meaning and application scope do not vary for validity and for
literal infringement purposes. 62 Given these conflicts and the fact that the
leading commentators generally treat claim meaning to be interpreted at
the time of infringement, and thus claims may permissibly expand their
scope over time for purposes of literal infringement, many practitioners
likely assume that this is the law. But it is not. Accordingly, it is long
overdue to correct that misperceived but common wisdom.

60. See id. at 432 n.147 (citing Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
61. Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technology and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 167–68 (2005).
62. Similar conflicts now are arising under United Kingdom law, given adoption of the
doctrine of equivalents and the separation of purposive interpretation scope for validity and
infringement scope under the doctrine of equivalents. See Antony Craggs, News from Abroad –
Technetix v. Teleste: Doctrine of Equivalents, PATENT DOCS (June 11, 2019),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2019/06/news-from-abroad-technetix-v-teleste-doctrine-ofequivalents.html [https://perma.cc/TQA9-L4N6] (“As validity was not in issue in the case, however,
the nexus between validity and the doctrine of equivalents was not addressed. This was a particularly
acute issue because English law, prior to Actavis v. Lilly, conflated the test of novelty and
infringement, namely a claim lacked novelty if the prior publication disclosed subject-matter which,
if performed, would necessarily infringe the claim. In essence, the test for novelty elided construction
with infringement, with the latter now including the doctrine of equivalents.”).
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III. UNDER CURRENT FEDERAL CIRCUIT LAW, LITERAL CLAIM MEANING
AND APPLICATION SCOPE MAY NOT EXTEND TO AFTER-ARISING
TECHNOLOGIES.
It is uncontested that neither claim meaning nor claim application
scope may expand over time for validity purposes. This was clearly
established in 1977 by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in the
famous In re Hogan case. 63 The court held in Hogan that claim meaning
for enablement could not be construed based on later-developed meanings
in the art for claim terms, and that after-arising technologies that would
embody such expanded meanings (relative to the meaning as of the
effective filing date) should not be held to invalidate claims for lack of
enablement. 64 But Hogan expressly did not reach the question of whether
such claim meanings could be construed for literal infringement purposes
based on the later-developed meanings of claim terms. 65 Judge Miller in
Hogan concurred separately and expressly to address that issue, and to
suggest that claim terms could not and should not be construed based on
later meanings for literal infringement purposes. 66
As Professor Cotropia noted in 2005, however, claims may employ
broad terminology that is not limited to particular structures known at a
particular time to embody those terms (thereby effectively employing
functional language). To construe those terms to cover after-arising
63. See In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 604 (C.C.P.A. 1977). See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 53, at
106–07 (also citing Plant Genetic Sys., N.V., 315 F.3d at 1340).
64. See Hogan, 559 F.2d at 605–07; see also id. at 606 (“To now say that appellants should
have disclosed in 1953 the amorphous form which on this record did not exist until 1962, would be
to impose an impossible burden on inventors and thus on the patent system. . . . Consideration of a
later existing state of the art in testing for compliance with § 112, first paragraph, would not only
preclude the grant of broad claims, but would wreak havoc in other ways as well.”).
65. See id. at 607 (explaining the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO’s) concern that
permitting the claim “might lead to enforcement efforts against the later developers. Any such
conjecture, if it exists, is both irrelevant and unwarranted. The business of the PTO is patentability,
not infringement.”).
66. Id. at 610 (Miller, J., concurring) (“Contrary to the majority opinion, to permit the ‘outer
boundaries’ of a claim to be construed in light of later art, rather than in light of art at the time the
patent application was filed, could well impede progress in the useful arts. . . . The majority opinion
notes . . . that any conjecture on this point [of potential broader infringement scope] is ‘both irrelevant
and unwarranted,’ . . . . [But] the majority opinion advocates a double standard: for the inventor,
interpret the language of the claims against later developers in light of the later state of the art; but for
the PTO, as held here, interpret such language against the inventor only in light of the state of the art
at the time the application was filed. I do not agree that such a double standard is needed to spur
invention.”). Cf. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V., 315 F.3d at 1341 (stating that the discussion of pioneer
patents in Hogan was “extended dicta”) (quoting Hogan, 559 F.2d at 610 (Miller, J., concurring) and
citing Hogan, 559 F.2d at 606); id. (“We do not need to address all of the insightful comments made
by the concurring judge; it is sufficient for the present case that we hold the district court did not err
in not applying Hogan’s dicta to its enablement analysis.”).
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technologies would not only generate enablement concerns, it would
invariably result in a written description problem and add prohibited “new
matter” to the application. 67 The Federal Circuit in the en banc Ariad
Pharmaceuticals case later impliedly affirmed this understanding, i.e.,
that claim scope must be limited to (at least constructively) known
embodiments as of the date of application filing. 68 If after-arising
technologies were included within claim meaning for validity scope, the
claims should necessarily fail the possession test, which requires an
objective disclosure that would demonstrate to a person of ordinary skill
that the applicant mentally recognized and possessed the full scope of the
claimed invention. As the court stated in Ariad:
a generic claim may define the boundaries of a vast genus of chemical
compounds, and yet the question may still remain whether the
specification, including original claim language, demonstrates that the
applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to a
genus. . . . [In Regents of the University of California v. Lilly, 69 w]e held
that a sufficient description of a genus instead requires the disclosure of
either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the
genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that
one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the
genus. 70

In regard to claim meaning and application scope for literal
infringement purposes, the Federal Circuit’s 2000 decision in Schering
Corp. v. Amgen Inc. 71 appears to be the first Federal Circuit case directly
addressing after-arising technologies, and therefore establishes the law
unless and until overturned en banc. Nevertheless, Schering was then
followed by other cases alternatively corroborating and conflicting with

67. See Cotropia, supra note 61, at 165 (“The claims can be drafted to literally describe
technology not yet known, as demonstrated above. But the claims technically cannot capture the laterdeveloped technologies because to do so would require the claims to be interpreted as they are
understood at some time after the filing date. ‘In fact, the quintessential example of an enforceable
equivalent, after-arising technology, would always be unclaimable new matter’ for the patent as
filed.”) (citation omitted); see also 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2018).
68. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
69. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
70. Ariad Pharm., 598 F.3d at 1349–50 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 119 F.3d at
1568–69) (emphasis added). Cf. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335,
1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“We do not read Hogan as allowing an inventor to claim what was
specifically desired but difficult to obtain at the time the application was filed, unless the patent
discloses how to make and use it.”) (emphasis added).
71. See generally Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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its holding. 72 I briefly discuss these cases in more detail below. However,
it bears noting that the academic commentary also sometimes refers to a
non-precedential 1974 case from the Seventh Circuit, Laser Alignment,
Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc. 73 And the academic commentary largely
(and properly) ignores dicta in the 1977 Court of Claims Lockheed
Aircraft v. United States case that might suggest that claims may be
literally infringed by after-arising technologies, 74 treating that case as a
means-plus-function case subject to the temporal limitation rule, as well
as actually addressing equivalents that were known in the art at the time
of filing. 75
72. See, e.g., CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 31, at § 18.03(2)(g); Lemley, supra note 53, at
104, 108–10; Burk & Lemley, supra note 54, at 1757.
73. Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1974). See, e.g.,
Lemley, supra note 53, at 108 n.31. Federal Circuit precedents that cite the case do not address its
discussion of after-arising technologies. See, e.g., Coleco Indus. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com’n, 573
F.2d 1247, 1257 n.9 (C.C.P.A 1978).
74. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 553 F.2d 69, 79–80, 83–84 (Ct. Cl. 1977)
(“Having determined that the claims in issue are entitled to a broad range of equivalents, the claims
must next be read upon the accused device. As fully set forth in the findings, using claim 1 as a
representative claim, it is clear that claim 1 literally reads on the accused device. The inquiry
continues, however, for the accused device must additionally be shown to substantively infringe the
claims by performing the same work, in substantially the same manner to achieve substantially the
same result as the claimed device. . . . It is, of course, fundamental that a patentee need disclose only
the best mode conceived by him for practicing the invention, not all conceivable modes. . . . [The
inventor] was not ‘personally familiar’ with pulse compression in 1954 and the patent in suit
appropriately reflects what he conceived to be the best mode at that time. This does not vitiate
equivalency. It has long been settled that infringement is not avoided by an equivalent that was not
known at the time of the invention.”) (citing WALKER ON PATENTS § 417 (1917 & 1929 eds.))
(emphasis added). Similarly, in d Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967), the
discussion focused on not limiting claim construction to the best mode, absent any indication in the
specification that the invention itself was limited to that disclosed embodiment. See id. at 399.
Although the court upheld some findings of infringement by an after-arising technology, the decision
did not focus on that question. Instead, it states that a “‘patentee’s broadest claim can be no broader
than his actual invention,’” and, in the context of discussing prosecution history estoppel, that a
patentee “cannot construe the claims narrowly before the Patent Office and later broadly before the
courts.” Id. at 398–99. Further, in regard to many of the patent claims at issue, the court appears to
have relied on the reverse doctrine of equivalents to avoid literal infringement, and where it found
infringement did not explicitly discuss the after-arising nature of the technology. See id. at 403–14.
Finally, the decision notes that the range of equivalents is broader for pioneer patents, but that in
determining that range “‘[o]ne important guide is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would
have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was.’”
Id. at 400 (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)). But to
the extent that it construed claims to include such after-arising technologies, the Autogiro decision
would appear to violate the axiomatic equivalency of claim scope for infringement and validity and
to be impliedly overruled by Ariad Pharmaceuticals.
75. See Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 553 F.2d at 80–81 (discussing “means responsive” element
of the claim); id. at 82 (citing Graver Tank and discussing known interchangeability for equivalency
analysis); id. at 83–84 (focusing on the need to disclose only the best mode and that doing so does not
vitiate equivalency); see also e.g., R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 4:87 n.9 (4th ed.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/1

18

Sarnoff: Correcting Misunderstandings

2019]

CORRECTING MISUNDERSTANDINGS

785

I am not aware of any Federal Circuit precedents decided between
Hogan and Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc. that directly and explicitly held
for literal infringement purposes that claim meaning may be construed at
a later time than filing or that application scope of a temporally fixed
meaning for claim terms may expand so as to treat after-arising
technologies as claim embodiments. 76 None of the commentaries on the
law recited in Part II refer to any such decision, nor to any Supreme Court
decision directly on point. 77 Thus, it appears that Schering is the first

April 2017 on-line update) (explaining how the Graver Tank test was used in interpreting a means
expression for literal infringement) (citing Lockheed Aircraft, 553 F.2d at 69); David Abraham, In re
Donaldson, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 622, 624 (1994) (“The Federal Circuit has held [in
Lockheed Aircraft] that elements known to be interchangeable to those of ordinary skill at the time
the invention was made are deemed to have equivalent structure.”) (citing, inter alia, Lockheed
Aircraft, 553 F.2d at 82); JoAnne Rosenblum, Patent Law—Doctrine of Equivalents—Has the
Federal Circuit Dealt a Mortal Blow to the Doctrine of Equivalents?, Pennwalt Corporation v.
Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987), 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 671, 671 n.2
(1989) (“Courts have adopted the doctrine of equivalents to interpret patent claims liberally to cover
a reasonable range of equivalent devices.”) (citing Lockheed Aircraft, 553 F.2d at 79). And even if
Lockheed Aircraft were somehow properly considered to have established an earlier panel precedent
on literal infringement scope, the later en banc Ariad decision on written description implicitly
overruled Lockheed Aircraft’s status as binding precedent given the axiomatic equivalency of validity
and infringement scope and the invalidity of such claims. See authorities cited supra notes 10, 13 and
accompanying text.
76. Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000). As noted above, however,
one Seventh Circuit case held in 1974 that claim meaning and application scope may expand for literal
infringement. See Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1974). And
one Court of Claims decision from 1977 also could be read to reach the same result, although its
language actually suggests a doctrine of equivalents analysis was employed. See Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 553 F.2d at 79 (the claim “should be accorded a broad and liberal interpretation so as to cover
a reasonable range of equivalent devices performing substantially the same work in substantially the
same manner to achieve substantially the same results as the claimed system read in light of the
disclosed modes.”).
77. Although the Supreme Court held in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002), that patent infringement scope is not limited to literal claim meanings, it
provided such protection under the doctrine of equivalents, and not by liberal claim construction that
would expand claim meaning or application to embody after-arising technologies. See Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731–32 (2002) (“The language in the patent
claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe with complete precision the range
of its novelty. If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be greatly
diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat the patent,
and its value to inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of copying. For this reason, the clearest
rule of patent interpretation, literalism, may conserve judicial resources but is not necessarily the most
efficient rule. The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all
equivalents to the claims described.”) (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 347 (15 How. 1853)
(emphasis added). Similarly, although the Supreme Court in Festo referred to equivalents that were
“unforeseeable at the time of amendment” when authorizing application of the doctrine of equivalents
to such amended claims, nothing in the Court’s discussion suggests that the meaning or application
of the claim as originally filed or as amended could be expanded to reach such unforeseeable afterarising technologies for literal infringement purposes. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 738.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

19

Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 1

786

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[53:767

Supreme Court or Federal Circuit precedent to directly address this issue.
And Schering held that for literal infringement, claim meaning may not
expand to embrace and application scope may not include after-arising
technologies, simultaneously suggesting that the claims would be invalid
for lack of written description if they did so. 78
In Schering, the claims were directed to a particular form of
interferon, “interferon alpha,” or “IFN-α,” originally identified in the
specification as “leukocyte interferon,” but it was changed during
prosecution to IFN-α because leukocytes had been determined to produce
more than one kind of interferon and a committee of scientists adopted
more precise terminology to reference the different forms. The district
court had held that the change in terminology “imported years of scientific
advance into the ‘901 patent’s disclosure and claims,” and prohibited
those claims from being construed to include the later meaning under the
“new matter” prohibition of § 132(a). 79 As a result, the district court
dismissed the suit on non-infringement grounds and dismissed as moot
arguments that the claims (by applying to after-arising technologies) were
invalid. 80 In contrast, the Federal Circuit held that the substitution of
terminology did not and was not intended to incorporate such afterarising technologies and further limited the construction of the claim term
“IFN-α” to the actual species of interferon that the applicant had
discovered, conceived of, possessed, and disclosed (by deposit). Although
one might try to read Schering as limited to claims where the applicant
did not intend to claim after-arising technologies, the Court’s language
was not so limited: “The term as used in the ‘901patent, however, did not
and could not enlarge the scope of the patent to embrace technology
arising after its filing.” 81 In other words, the claims were required to be
construed for literal infringement purposes in light of what the applicant
had actually invented, disclosed, and claimed at the time of filing its
application.
Schering thus affirmed the non-infringement holding of the district
court while also emphasizing that such temporal expansion of claim
78. I differ here slightly from Professor Cotropia’s statement that “[w]hile not addressing the
question of after-arising equivalents directly, the Federal Circuit in Schering explains how a claim
cannot literally cover later-developed technologies.” Cotropia, supra note 61, at 166. As explained
below, both the district court and the Federal Circuit ruled on literal non-infringement grounds. See
authorities cited infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
79. Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
80. See Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 375, 378 (D. Del. 1999) (“Judgment will
be entered against Schering and in favor of Amgen on plaintiffs’ infringement claim. The Court will
also dismiss without prejudice Amgen’s [invalidity] counterclaims as moot.”).
81. Schering, 222 F.3d at 1353 (emphasis added). See id. at 1353–54.
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meaning would violate the written description doctrine. 82 The court thus
implicitly held, as it has repeated elsewhere, that it “is axiomatic that
claims are [to be] construed the same way for both invalidity and
infringement.” 83 Accordingly, Schering establishes the law in the Federal
Circuit on whether after-arising technologies can literally infringe claims
in the absence of controlling Supreme Court or later en banc Federal
Circuit precedent. 84
The Schering case was decided earlier than either the conflicting
Superguide case or the conflicting Innogenetics case, as well as before the
Kopykake, Plant Genetic Systems, and Chiron cases that are consistent
with Schering. 85 Perhaps unremarkably, the Schering case was neither
relied on nor distinguished by—nor was it even cited in—the Plant
Genetic Systems, Chiron, SuperGuide, or Innogenetics cases. And
although the panel in Schering addressed an amended claim term added
during prosecution, holding that it must be construed in the same manner
as of the effective filing date of the original claim language, the same
principal should apply to interpretation and construction of the meaning
and application of originally filed claim language that is not amended.
In Kopykake Enterprises., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 86 the Federal Circuit
reaffirmed the holding in Schering, stating that “when a claim term
understood to have a narrow meaning when the application is filed later
acquires a broader definition, the literal scope of the term is limited to
what it was understood to mean at the time of filing.” 87 This language
clearly demonstrates the contemporaneous understanding that Schering

82. See id. at 1351–52 (discussing the district court’s holding that the substitution of later
technological terminology imported new matter); id. at 1353–54 (“Because, at the time of the ‘901
application, neither Dr. Weissmann nor others skilled in the art knew of the existence of, let alone the
identity of, the specific polypeptides now identified as subtypes of IFN-α, those subtypes cannot be
within the scope of the claims. The district court correctly concluded . . . that only one subspecies of
alpha interferon was described and enabled in the specification.”) (citation omitted).
83. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing
W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
84. See, e.g., Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(en banc) (“Panel opinions are, of course, opinions of the court and may only be changed by the court
sitting en banc.”). See also Deckers Corp. v. United States, 752 F.3d 949, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing
Robert Bosch, 719 F.3d at 1316, UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1987), Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 772 F.2d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1985), and
Mother’s Rest., Inc. v. Mama’s Pizza, Inc., 723 F.2d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
85. See authorities cited supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. Cf. Sarnoff, supra note 6,
at 430 n.141. And the Seventh Circuit case is not binding precedent in the Federal Circuit. Laser
Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1974).
86. Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
87. Id. at 1383 (citing Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1352–54 (Fed. Cir.
2000)).
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established a clear precedent on the issue and was not limited to the facts
of the case and the applicant’s intent. In Kopykake Enterprises, the district
court had found the claim term “screen printing” that was at issue should
be construed broadly to cover “conventional” methods of applying images
but that it did not apply to ink-jet printing methods for printing shapes on
edible bases, as ink-jet printing was only emerging for printing on paper
and was not “commonplace” for foodstuffs at the time of filing. 88 The
Federal Circuit rejected arguments that the prosecution history had
disclaimed ink-jet printing. It held that the claim term should be
understood broadly in light of the specification’s reference to
“conventional printing processes” for foodstuffs, and affirmed the district
court that although ink-jet printing was known (and cited in the
prosecution record), it was not then conventional for foodstuffs and the
claim would not have been understood in the art at the time of filing to
include it. 89
In Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 90 the
Federal Circuit avoided reaching the question of whether the claim
construction should include after-arising technology based on
amendments made to the claim during prosecution (to avoid an
enablement rejection) that excluded such technology. Specifically, the
applicant had added the terms “‘susceptible to infection and
transformation by Agrobacterium and capable of regeneration’ of the
plant and seed claims.” 91 The district court construed that language from
the perspective of a skilled practitioner as excluding monocot plants and
cells (such as the allegedly infringing genetically modified corn) because
the specification did not disclose methods for such transformation and the
state of the art as of the filing date did not supply evidence that such viable
transformation could be accomplished in monocots. 92 The Federal Circuit
affirmed the construction based on the prosecution history but also stated
in dicta that “when a claim term understood to have a narrow meaning
when the application is filed later acquires a broader definition, the literal
scope of the term is limited to what it was understood to mean at the time
of filing.” 93

88. See id. at 1379–80.
89. Id. at 1382–84. Kopykake thus did not address after-arising technology but rather “nascent”
technology, although not yet commonplace in the specific technological field. See authorities cited
infra note 100 and accompanying text.
90. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
91. Id. at 1344.
92. See id. at 1345.
93. Id. (citing Kopykake Enters., 264 F.3d at 1383).
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The Federal Circuit also sustained the district court’s invalidity
determinations of lack of enablement for certain cell claims that were
conceded to include stably-transformed monocots, which were then
known but “difficult to produce,” rejecting arguments that the district
court should have made findings regarding whether such claims should
receive “pioneering status.” 94 As the court stated:
PGS concedes that the cell claims cover monocot cells. Only by doing
so can PGS sue DeKalb, which makes monocot products, for
infringement. Having agreed that the cell claims encompass monocot
cells, a later development, PGS’ reliance on Hogan ignores the validityinfringement differentiation Hogan made. 95

Further, the court rejected arguments for broader scope for the enablement
inquiry based on Hogan’s statement that “pioneering inventions ‘deserve
broad claims to the broad concept,’” noting that Hogan’s discussion of
pioneering status was “extended dicta.” 96
In Chiron Corp. v. Genetech, Inc., 97 the Federal Circuit held that
claims construed broadly to include after-arising technology—in a laterfiled application claiming priority to an earlier application and thus to an
earlier state of the art (which claims were improperly found by a jury to
lack enablement because of after-arising technology)—actually lacked
written description priority support in the earlier filed application and
were thus invalid. 98 As the claim was invalid, there was no need for the
court to review the propriety of the district court’s claim construction for
literal infringement purposes, which had included the after-arising
technology within the scope of application of the later-application’s claim
meaning. Specifically, the claims issuing from the 1986 patent application
were construed by the district court to cover both humanized and chimeric
antibodies that had not been discovered in 1984 (the date of the earlier
patent application) and, thus, were invalid on written description grounds;
given that any such after-arising technology was impermissible new
matter as the claims of the later patent had been construed by the district
court to cover the after-arising technology.

94. Id. at 1339–41.
95. Id. at 1341.
96. Id. (quoting In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 610 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Miller, J., concurring), and
citing Hogan, 559 F.2d at 606); id. (“We do not need to address all of the insightful comments made
by the concurring judge; it is sufficient for the present case that we hold the district court did not err
in not applying Hogan’s dicta to its enablement analysis.”).
97. Chiron Corp. v. Genetech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
98. See id. at 1251–55.
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Because the first publication that disclosed chimeric antibody
technology did not appear until four months after this filing. . . . [T]his
sequence of events shows that this new technology arose after the filing
date and thus was, by definition, outside the bounds of the enablement
requirement. . . . In the context of the 1984 application, the trial court
and this court need not rely on enablement to support the jury’s verdict.
The jury may have found that the 1984 application does not provide any
support for the new matter, chimeric antibodies, claimed in the ‘561
patent. Because chimeric antibody technology did not even exist at the
time of the 1984 filing, the record conclusively supports that the Chiron
scientists did not possess and disclose this technology in the February
1984 filing. . . . In this case, the Chiron scientists, by definition, could
not have possession of, and disclose, the subject matter of chimeric
antibodies that did not even exist at the time of the 1984 application.
Thus, axiomatically, Chiron cannot satisfy the written description
requirement for the new matter appearing in the ‘561 patent, namely
chimeric antibodies. 99

In Chiron, moreover, the Federal Circuit distinguished so-called
“nascent” technology (known by the applicant) from after-arising
technology, requiring that nascent technology be disclosed by the
applicant. 100 And Judge Bryson concurred separately to emphasize that In
re Hogan should not be understood to have authorized claim meanings to
expand for literal infringement so as to cover after-arising technologies,
emphasizing that the court had recently “expressed reservations” about
such a reading in Plant Genetic Systems. 101
Nevertheless, in Superguide v. DirecTV Enterprises, 102 the Federal
Circuit found literal infringement of a claim by after-arising technology
99. Id. (citing Hogan, 559 F.2d at 605–06) (emphasis added).
100. See id. at 1254 (“[A] patent document cannot enable technology that arises after the date
of application. The law does not expect an applicant to disclose knowledge invented or developed
after the filing date. Such disclosure would be impossible. Nascent technology, however, must be
enabled with a ‘specific and useful teaching.’ The law requires an enabling disclosure for nascent
technology because a person of ordinary skill in the art has little or no knowledge independent from
the patentee’s instruction.”) (citations omitted). Further, such disclosure in theory should include
knowledge of the applicant that a nascent technology is in fact an equivalent and thus an embodiment
of the claim language. Cf. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)
(discussing known interchangeability of the allegedly equivalent technology).
101. See id. at 1262 (Bryson, J., concurring) (“What must be guarded against, in my view, is to
interpret Hogan to hold that claims that are enabled by the original application may be construed
broadly enough to encompass technology that is not developed until later and was not enabled by the
original application. Although there is language in Hogan that could be read to support such a result,
this court has recently (and properly, in my view) expressed reservations about reading Hogan that
broadly.”) (citing Plant Genetic Sys., N.V., v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340–41 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)).
102. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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without then finding the claim to be invalid. The court rejected the district
court’s claim constructions, which had excluded after-arising technology
(digital television signals) from the construed meaning of the relevant
claim language. The district court had treated such claim term meanings
(e.g., the claim term “regularly received television signal”) as limited to
the understanding in the art as of the filing date. 103 But the Federal Circuit
adopted constructions of the claim term meanings that included afterarising technologies. In doing so, the court apparently distinguished
functional claim terminology subject to the temporal limitation rule of
§ 112(f) from structural claim terminology:
We begin our review of the district court’s construction of the asserted
claim by agreeing with Gemstar that the court improperly relied on
cases involving means-plus-function claims to conclude that later or
“after-arising technologies” cannot fall within the literal scope of the
claim at issue. Method and apparatus claims not written in means-plusfunction format are not necessarily limited to that disclosed in the
specification but rather are defined by the language of the claims
themselves. 104

The court rejected the district court’s reliance on the understanding
of skilled persons that “regularly received” signals as of the filing date
could not mean digital signals (when digital televisions were not in
common use at that time), but the court distinguished the claims at issue
from those in Kopykake by stating that the term “regularly received” “did
not explicitly limit the disputed claim language to technologies that were
‘conventional’ at the time of the invention.” 105 Further, it appears that the
court applied the broadest dictionary meaning approach to construing the

103. Id. at 877.
104. Id. at 878 (citing SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“It is the claims that measure the invention.”)). SRI, however, addressed
concerns about not limiting structural claim language to a particular method of operation during
prosecution, nor reading the claim language to import all structural limitations in the specification,
and that claim meaning is not limited to the best mode disclosed, and went en banc to reject its earlier
precedent that the reverse doctrine of equivalents is a question of law, and remanded for factfinding
regarding application of that doctrine. See SRI Int’l, 775 F.2d at 1118–25. Nevertheless, SRI contains
dicta when discussing non-restriction of claims to the best mode disclosed that were relied on by
SuperGuide to permit expansion of claim meaning to after-arising technologies, subject to the reverse
doctrine. See id. at 1121 (“The law does not require the impossible. Hence, it does not require that an
applicant describe in his specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his
invention. The law recognizes that patent specifications are written for those skilled in the art, and
requires only that the inventor describe the ‘best mode’ known at the time to him of making and using
the invention.”).
105. Id. at 879 (quoting Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1380, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
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claims at issue, an approach articulated in Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v.
Telegenix, Inc., 106 but which all of the judges of the en banc Phillips Corp.
decision later rejected. 107
In Innogenetics v. Abbott Laboratories, 108 the Federal Circuit held
that a kit using Realtime polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to hybridize
samples to probes for hepatitis C virus literally infringed the method claim
at issue. 109 The court construed broadly the claim term of detecting
“formation of a complex” between the sample and probe, holding that the
claim did not require contemporaneous detection of the complex itself
(given that the claim included the term “complex as formed,” which
Abbott argued imposed a temporal limit on detection, and that Abbott’s
PCR method destroyed the complex so it only detected the fact that a
complex had been formed earlier). 110 The court relied on Superguide to
state that literal infringement can be found for after-arising technology if
“valid claims . . . are drafted broadly enough.” 111 The court held that the
claims literally infringed because Abbott had forfeited its district court
argument (by raising it at the last minute) that Realtime PCR “was not
known to the ordinary artisan at the time of the filing.” 112 As noted above,
however, if claims are drafted broadly using future-regarding terminology
or employ terminology that does not convey a future sense but
nevertheless is construed to include after-arising technology, such claims
should be held invalid for lack of enablement and of written description. 113
Thus, the statements regarding literal infringement and after-arising
technology in Innogentics were unnecessary dicta, both because the
argument had been waived and because the supposed later-arising
technology was actually known at the time of filing the claims. 114
In summary, absent clear Supreme Court or en banc Federal Circuit
precedent superseding Schering, Schering establishes the current law for

106. Tex. Dig. Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
107. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); id. at
1328–30 (Lourie, J., concurring); id. at 1332 (Mayer, J., dissenting); SuperGuide Corp., 358 F.3d at
874–75 (quoting Tex. Dig. Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d at 1202, and Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299
F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
108. Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
109. See id. at 1368.
110. Id. at 1370–71 (emphasis added).
111. See id. at 1371–72 (citing SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., 358 F.3d 870, 878–80
(Fed. Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 1371.
113. See authorities cited supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
114. See Innogenetics, N.V., 512 F.3d at 1372 (“Additionally, Abbott itself has put forth
evidence that Realtime PCR did in fact exist by the time the inventors filed their PCT application in
1992, and by the time they applied for the ‘704 patent in 1994.”).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/1

26

Sarnoff: Correcting Misunderstandings

2019]

CORRECTING MISUNDERSTANDINGS

793

literal infringement in regard to after-arising technologies. Of course, the
Federal Circuit’s rule that the first panel opinion establishes binding
circuit precedent may be followed more in the breach than in the
observance, as should be evident from Superguide and Innogenetics. It is
also subject to the Atlantic Thermoplastics “heresy . . . mutiny. . . .
illegal[ity]” problem that different panels of judges may interpret
Supreme Court precedents differently, treating an earlier panel decision
as invalid without taking the issue en banc. 115 But the Federal Circuit
rarely goes en banc to resolve such differing views of conflicting Supreme
Court precedents, and the Federal Circuit did not justify its Superguide
and Innogenetics dicta and holdings on the Supreme Court pioneering
invention precedents. As reflected in In re Hogan and the cases above, the
Supreme Court’s pioneering invention patent doctrine cases do not clearly
supersede the Schering holding that prevents after-arising technologies
from falling within the scope of claim meaning or application for literal
infringement purposes. 116 And the Federal Circuit rarely seeks to resolve
conflicting panel precedents that result when the earlier-in-time panel
decisions are ignored or are only selectively followed. 117
In contrast, as discussed in the next Part of this Article, current
§ 112(f) may be understood to have required the holding in Schering. If
structural claim terms are not construed as limited to technological
equivalents known as of the filing date to be embodiments, those terms
may effectively be considered functional claim terms. Temporally unfixed
structural claiming language requires functional testing to determine

115. Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(Rich, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“The Atlantic panel, [which had refused
to follow the earlier precedent in the Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d
1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991),] continued [to explain that]: ‘A[n earlier panel] decision that fails to consider
Supreme Court precedent does not control if the court [i.e. the Atlantic panel] determines that the
prior panel [in the Scripps case] would have reached a different conclusion if it had considered
controlling precedent.’ This is not only insulting to the [prior] Scripps panel (Chief Judge Markey,
Judge Newman and a visiting judge), it is mutiny. It is heresy. It is illegal.”).
116. See authorities cited supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
117. For example, the en banc Federal Circuit finally resolved the issue in Atlantic
Thermoplastics only 17 years later, and did so by violating the axiomatic principle that claims are to
be construed the same way for infringement as for validity. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566
F.3d 1282, 1291–95 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (relevant portion en banc) (affirming the later-in-time Atlantic
Thermoplastics panel holding that product-by-process claims may have different meanings for
infringement than validity, finally resolving the inconsistency of the two prior panel decisions and the
consequent uncertainty of the law during the intervening years, but abrogating the principle that
claims are axiomatically to be construed the same way for validity as for infringement); id. at 1318
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“For the first time, claims are construed differently for validity and for
infringement. It has been an inviolate rule that patent claims are construed the same way for validity
and for infringement.”) (citations omitted).
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whether any after-arising technology should be considered to be
equivalent to disclosed structural embodiments. Such temporally unfixed
structural terms therefore should also be subject to the § 112(f) rule of
claim construction for functional claiming language, as it has been
interpreted by the Federal Circuit in Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc.
v. Cardinal Industries, Inc. 118 and Al-Site Corp. v. VSI International,
Inc. 119 That interpretation temporally fixes literal infringement meaning
and application scope, restricting it to technologies equivalent to those
disclosed in the specification and (at least constructively) known to be
equivalent (and thus to be claim embodiments) at the time of filing. 120
IV. FUNCTIONAL CLAIM TERMS DO NOT EXTEND TO AFTER-ARISING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND STRUCTURAL CLAIM TERMS NOT TEMPORALLY
LIMITED TO KNOWN EQUIVALENT EMBODIMENTS SHOULD BE TREATED
AS FUNCTIONAL.
Prior to the 1952 Act, the Supreme Court expressed substantial
ambivalence about its earlier approaches to permissible claim scope,
particularly in regard to functionally claimed inventions. In the 1946
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing v. Walker case, 121 the Supreme Court
precluded the use of functional claiming language for literal infringement
purposes that would treat any after-arising equivalent technologies as
construed claim embodiments, at least at the point of novelty of the claim:
We must, however, determine whether, as petitioner charges, the claims
here held valid run afoul of Rev. Stat. § 4888 because they do not
describe the invention but use “conveniently functional language at the
exact point of novelty.” . . . The language of the claim thus describes this
most crucial element in the ‘new’ combination in terms of what it will
do rather than in terms of its own physical characteristics or its
arrangement in the new combination apparatus. We have held that a
claim with such a description of a product is invalid as a violation of
Rev. Stat. § 4888. . . . It is urged that our conclusion is in conflict with
the decision of Continental Paper Bag Co. . . . In that case, however, the
claims structurally described the physical and operating relationship of
all the crucial parts of the novel combination. 122

118. Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
119. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
120. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, 145 F.3d at 1310; Al-Site Corp., 174 F.3d at 1320.
121. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946).
122. See id. at 8–9, 14 (emphasis added) (citing Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210
U.S. 405 (1908), and Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245 (1928)).
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In response, Congress revised the Halliburton holding to impose a
particular rule of construction for claims using functional claiming
language. Then § 112, ¶ 3 (later ¶ 6, and now § 112(f)) provides:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts
described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 123

The Supreme Court has not weighed in on this provision, except (as noted
above) to hold in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. 124
that it did not impliedly repeal the Court’s doctrine of equivalents decision
in 1950 in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co. 125
Graver Tank had authorized patent protection beyond the construed scope
of meaning and application of patent claims. 126
In contrast, the Federal Circuit has construed § 112(f) to impose a
temporal restriction on the meaning and application of functional claim
terms, restricting them from after-arising technologies. This rule of claim
interpretation restricts claim meaning and application scope to those
structural technologies embodying the identically claimed function that
were known at the time of filing to perform the function and to be
equivalent to structural embodiments of that function disclosed in the
specification. As the Federal Circuit stated in Chiuminatta Concrete
Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indutries, Inc.: 127
The doctrine of equivalents is necessary because one cannot predict the
future. Due to technological advances, a variant of an invention may be
developed after the patent is granted, and that variant may constitute so
insubstantial a change from what is claimed in the patent that it should
be held to be an infringement. Such a variant, based on after-developed
technology, could not have been disclosed in the patent. Even if such an
element is found not to be a § 112, ¶ 6, equivalent because it is not
equivalent to the structure disclosed in the patent, this analysis should
not foreclose it from being an equivalent under the doctrine of
equivalents. 128

123. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2018).
124. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27–28 (1997).
125. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
126. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 27–28; Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 608–
09; see authorities cited supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
127. Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
128. Id. at 1310 (emphasis added).
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One year later, the Federal Circuit elaborated on its holding in
Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts to make this implication even clearer in
Al-Site Corp. v. VSI International, Inc.: 129
As this court has recently clarified, a structural equivalent under § 112
must have been available at the time of the issuance of the claim. An
equivalent structure or act under § 112 cannot embrace technology
developed after the issuance of the patent because the literal meaning of
a claim is fixed upon its issuance. An “after arising equivalent”
infringes, if at all, under the doctrine of equivalents. 130

And as the court has more recently explained:
In Chiuminatta, we explained that there are two differences between the
equivalence determination made for literal infringement purposes under
§ 112(f) and a doctrine of equivalents determination for the same
limitation: timing and [identity rather than just similarity of] function. 131
Equivalence under section 112(f) is evaluated at the time of issuance.
Equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents, in contrast, is evaluated
at the time of infringement. Hence, an after-arising technology, a
technology that did not exist at the time of patenting, can be found to be
an equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents even though it cannot be
an equivalent under the literal infringement analysis of § 112(f). 132

Thus, whenever such functional claiming language is construed to be
present (under the en banc Federal Circuit’s new standards 133 for
determining whether claim language is subject to the § 112(f) interpretive
rule), the functional claim terms cannot be literally infringed by any afterarising technologies. This is true even if the after-arising technology
performs the identical function and is structurally equivalent to disclosed
embodiments in the specification, so long as the identity of function or the
structural equivalency was not known (at least constructively to a person
of ordinary skill in the art) at the time of filing. Similarly, such functional
claim terms also should not apply to any nascent technologies existing as
of the filing date but that were not known in the art to perform the function
129. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
130. Id. at 1320 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
131. See Chiuminatta Concrete, 145 F.3d at 1310; Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185
F.3d 1259, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
132. Ring & Pinion Serv. Inc. v. ARB Corp., 743 F.3d 831, 839 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing
Chiuminatta Concrete, 145 F.3d at 1310, and Al-Site, 174 F.3d at 1320) (emphasis added).
133. See, e.g., Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relevant
portion en banc) (rejecting various earlier panel decisions that had created a “strong” presumption
against the application of § 112(f) when the claim limitation at issue did not employ the specific terms
“means for” or “step for” but nevertheless should be construed as functional claiming language that
triggers the statutory construction rule).
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and to be equivalent structures. To so hold would render such claims
invalid for lack of written description under the Ariad Pharmaceuticals
possession test as the specification would not objectively disclose that the
inventor “visualized or recognized” that its functional claim terms
embraced structures unknown-to-be equivalent or unknown to perform
the required functions. 134
Thus, for literal infringement purposes, functional claiming language
must be restricted (under the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 112(f))
to structures known to perform the recited function and known to be
equivalent at the time of filing. This is all the more true for after-arising
technologies that require later-developed testing methods in order for a
skilled practitioner to recognize or to demonstrate that the after-arising
technologies perform the same function and are structurally equivalent. 135
The § 112(f) temporal fixation rule must apply, unless the axiomatic
equivalency of claim meaning for validity and claim meaning for literal
infringement is to be violated.
But what about structural claim terms that Congress (and the Federal
Circuit by construction) has not statutorily subjected to § 112(f)’s
temporal fixation rule? I believe that such structural language also should
subject to the same temporal fixation rule, applying only to structures that
were known in the art at the time of filing to be equivalent structures
within the meaning of the structural claim language.
The reason for restricting such structural claiming language to
known-to-be equivalent structures is based on treating the claim terms (as
concepts) to be “intensional” definitions that specify the necessary and
sufficient conditions for their meaning and thus for their factual

134. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the need to explicitly disclose in the
specification any nascent technology).
135. Cf. Cotropia, supra note 61, at 153 (“Inventors can write claim language to include
technologies unknown at the time of drafting by using functional or generally descriptive terms so as
not to ‘date’ the claim terms.”); Timothy C. Saulsbury, Pioneers Versus Improvers: Enabling Optimal
Patent Claim Scope, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 439, 456 (2010) (“When improvements
are framed in terms of newly-invented (or newly discovered) properties for preexisting things, it
becomes clear that thing construction can conceal the post-filing growth in literal scope that is
required for a claim to encompass later-developed technology; a court need only engage in a manner
of thing construction that overlooks the newly-invented property that marks the improvement as later
developed.”); id. at 456 n.99 (“This elimination ‘renders the after-arising property irrelevant to the
identity of thing-types and the distinctions between them. When the after-arising property is not a
definitional property of the tallied thing-types, the allegedly infringing [improvement] can be thrown
into a preexisting conceptual thing-type basket created for the constructively disclosed [i.e., enabled,]
embodiments.’”) (quoting Collins, supra note 3, at 518).
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application. 136 If claim scope were not temporally fixed in this manner, it
would require functional testing to determine whether structures that are
not already known to be within the necessary and sufficient conditions of
the meaning of structural claim terms exhibit those conditions of meaning.
This would effectively convert the structural claim term into a functional
claim term. Conversely, where functional testing demonstrates that the
necessary and sufficient functional conditions of structural meaning are
lacking, the alleged structural equivalent should be excluded from the
claim meaning under the so-called reverse doctrine of equivalents.137
As Professor Chisum noted in his treatise, “[i]t would seem to follow
that, to the extent that the meaning of a patent claim depends on the state
of the art or on tests, standards or measurements established in the art, the
time framework should be the filing date.” 138 And if functional testing is
required to determine whether technologies not already recognized as
structural term embodiments should be treated as exhibiting the necessary
and sufficient conditions of structural meaning, then the structural claim
term is effectively operating as a functional limitation139 and should also
be subject to the § 112(f) temporal fixation rule. 140

136. See generally Roy T. Cook, Intensional Definition, in A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL
LOGIC 155 (2009). In contrast, one might treat claim meaning as extensional, requiring analogical
similarity judgments to determine meaning rather than using logical deduction to determine the
application (or not) of necessary and sufficient conditions of intensional meaning to particular sets of
facts. Cf., e.g., Terje Aaberge & Rajendra Akerkar, Ontology and Ontology Construction:
Background and Practices, 9 INT’L J. COMPUTER SCI. & APPLICATIONS 32, 32 (2012) (“There are
two ways of representing meaning formally, referred to as extensional and intensional and
corresponding to the complementary theories of meaning, semantics and pragmatics; semantics
focuses on the relation between words and what they stand for, their denotata, while pragmatics
concern how context contributes to meaning.”).
137. See, e.g., Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 569, 571 (1898) (“But,
after all, even if the patent for a machine be a pioneer, the alleged infringer must have done something
more than reach the same result. He must have reached it by substantially the same or similar means,
or the rule that the function of a machine cannot be patented is of no practical value. To say that the
patentee of a pioneer invention for a new mechanism is entitled to every mechanical device which
produces the same result is to hold, in other language, that he is entitled to patent his function. Mere
variations of form may be disregarded, but the substance of the invention must be there. . . .
Conceding that the functions of the two devices are practically the same, the means used in
accomplishing this function are so different that we find it impossible to say, even in favor of a
primary patent, that they are mechanical equivalents.”).
138. CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 35, at § 18.03(2)(g).
139. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349–51 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see
authorities cited supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
140. Similarly, even if structural claim meaning is treated as an extensional definition, requiring
similarity comparisons to disclosed embodiments to determine equivalency and to build up the set of
embodiments of meaning, determining such similarity and including it within the scope of that
extensional meaning will still require functional testing. Cf. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure
of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1205–06 (2008)
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Further, the knowledge acquired in the process of such functional
testing to determine the application of structural meaning may lead to
further refinement of the meaning of the structural claim language. 141 In
doing so, it may make clearer the functional requirements that were
intended by the earlier structural meaning. 142 Thus, failing to fix temporal
meaning or temporal application of meaning to structures that were known
at the time of filing to be equivalent substitutes to embodiments of
structural claim terms effectively converts structural claiming terms into
functional claiming terms. 143
In many cases, it may be extremely difficult to determine the implicit
functions of structural claim terms in order to determine what things in
the world exhibit the necessary and sufficient conditions of structural
meaning (as of the effective filing date). For example, it may be unclear
what functions must be performed for some new combination of structures
to constitute a claimed door “knob.” 144 And it may require later

(discussing the written description “possession” test and noting that “[r]ecitation of the features or
properties of a genus corresponds to definition by intension, or definition per genus et differentiam.
In this classical mode of definition, a thing is defined by specifying the proximate genus to which it
belongs, and those properties which differentiate it from other members of the genus. The alternative
mode of description suggested by Lilly, enumeration of a representative number of members of the
genus, corresponds to definition by extension, or definition by type. It proceeds by designating some
individual or group of individuals as central or typical members of the genus and determining
membership in the genus by degree of resemblance. Yet every claim is in the end a genus claim.”);
Lemley, supra note 53, at 120 n.81 (“The effective scope of those claims may still expand over time
for another reason. . . . [A]s new species within the genus are discovered, the practical scope of the
patent is broadened to cover new products. But the legal scope of the claimed invention remains the
same.”).
141. See Lefstin, supra note 140, at 1205–06. It may also alter claim meanings, typically by
expansion and also by potentially suggesting more precise, intentional definitions of the meanings for
the claimed structural terms. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2000); see authorities cited supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
142. Thus, in Schering, the court held that further analysis and testing that led to expansion of
structural term meaning had to be limited to the earlier understanding, or it would have imported new
matter. See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1352.
143. Cf. Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“stating in reference to the doctrine of equivalents that consideration ‘must be given
to the purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when combined with the
other ingredients, and the function which it is intended to perform. An important factor is whether
persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not
contained in the patent with one that was.’”) (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod.
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)) (emphasis added).
144. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 264 (1850) (“The improvement
consists in making the knobs of clay or porcelain, and in fitting them for their application to doors,
locks, and furniture, and various other uses to which they may be adapted . . . .”) (emphasis added).
Cf. Lefstin, supra note 140, at 1199 (“The question of ‘possession of the invention’ is simply not a
meaningful inquiry under our current claiming system. In the peripheral claiming system, ‘the
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developments in the state of the art to actually determine what those
functions were that established the conditions of meaning of the structural
terms as they were understood as of the filing date (which may then lead
to further specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions of structural
term meanings). 145 Thus, unless structural claim term meaning and
application scope is fixed by reference to technologies at least
constructively known by a skilled artisan as of the filing date to exhibit
those functions and to be embodiments, the claim term should be
considered a functional claim term subject to § 112(f), just as if it
employed more explicitly functional claiming language. 146 Consequently,
under current law (as § 112(f) has been construed), all claim terms should
have temporally fixed construed meanings and temporally fixed
applications of those meanings for purposes of both validity and
infringement determinations. At least until the interpretation of § 112(f)

invention’ is a bundle of properties recited by the claims, defining the perimeter of the patentee’s
legal right to exclude.”) (emphasis added).
145. See, e.g., cf. Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1567–68 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (“The operative definition for purposes of equivalency analysis is the intended function as seen
in the context of the patent, the prosecution history, and the prior art. Based on our review of these
materials, we conclude that no reasonable jury could have adopted the broad definition suggested by
the trial court. As noted, the specification expressly defines fibrin binding as a critical component of
the ‘function’ of human t-PA. . . . Other evidence confirms this. According to a British patent
application filed by Foundation, it is critical in a therapeutic sense—it reduces the risk of
hemorrhaging. Moreover, as Drs. Goeddel and Collen testified, the fibrin binding affinity of human
t-PA is a critical distinction between this protein and the two prior plasminogen activators, urokinase
and streptokinase. Thus, a functional definition of t-PA which ignores this distinction would result in
a range of equivalents which impermiss[i]bly reads on the prior art.”) (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S.
at 609; Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1994))
(emphasis added).
146. Cf. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1946) (“Neither in
the specification, the drawing, nor in the claims here under consideration, was there any indication
that the patentee contemplated any specific structural alternative for the acoustical resonator or for
the resonator’s relationship to the other parts of the machine. . . . Just how many different devices
there are of various kinds and characters which would serve to emphasize these echoes, we do not
know. The Halliburton device, alleged to infringe, employs an electric filter for this purpose. In this
age of technological development there may be many other devices beyond our present information
or indeed our imagination which will perform that function and yet fit these claims. . . . Yet if
Walker’s blanket claims be valid, no device to clarify echo waves, now known or hereafter invented,
whether the device be an actual equivalent of Walker’s ingredient or not, could be used in a
combination such as this, during the life of Walker’s patent.”); Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents
and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 905–06 (2013) (“Most software
patents today are written in functional terms. If courts would faithfully apply the 1952 Act, limiting
those claims to the actual algorithms the patentees disclosed and their equivalents, they could prevent
overclaiming by software patentees and solve much of the patent thicket problem that besets software
innovation.”).
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is further changed by Congress, 147 the Supreme Court, or the Federal
Circuit en banc.
Congress was careful in 1952 to preserve much of the prior law
regarding claim scope when it adopted the predecessor to § 112(f).
Although Congress expressly rejected proposed legislative language that
would have explicitly authorized functional claiming language to apply to
after-arising technologies, Congress did not thereby clearly prohibit such
a judicial interpretation. 148 As discussed above, the Supreme Court has
not interpreted § 112(f) except peripherally in regard to not overruling the
doctrine of equivalents, and the Federal Circuit has not to date construed
§ 112(f) to permit the functional claiming of after-arising technologies. 149
For the additional reasons expressed above, structural claiming language
should be treated the same way.
Nevertheless, change remains possible. Congress or the courts could
permit literal infringement scope to expand to technologies not known to
be equivalent embodiments of functional or structural claiming terms as
of the filing date. But if such changes were to be made, they will raise
many more, and more complex issues in addition to breaking the
axiomatic symmetry of claim scope for validity and literal infringement

147. Cf., e.g., Press Release, Senator Thom Tillis, Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins,
Johnson, and Stivers Release Draft Bill Text to Reform Section 101 of the Patent Act (May 22, 2019)
(available at https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-and-coons-and-reps-collins-johnsonand-stivers-release-draft-bill-text-to-reform-section-101-of-the-patent-act [https://perma.cc/53BMDDGK]) (Draft 101 Legislative Language circulated by Senators Tillis and Coons for U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property Hearings, June 4, 2019. Draft language
apparently intended to codify the holding in Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349–
51 (Fed. Cir. 2015): “Section 112 (f) Functional Claim Elements— An element in a claim expressed
as a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof shall be
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.”).
148. See Sarnoff, DOE Part II, supra note 20, at 490–91 (“A coordinating committee of patent
law associations had suggested specific changes to a draft of what was then H.R. 3760, which included
a recommendation to add to the mean-plus-function claim provision language authorizing such claims
to encompass equivalents ‘whether or not known at the time the invention was made.’ The legislative
history is silent as to why Congress did not adopt the recommendation. Given the consistent prior
case law limiting improvement inventions to known technological equivalents, Congress most likely
would have adopted such language if it had meant to encourage the courts to provide protection for
later-arising equivalents of such functionally drafted claims.”) (citation omitted). Cf. id. at 473 (A
long line of cases under the 1870 Act imposed “limits on claim scope and claiming language [that]
prevented improvement invention patents from treating as equivalents to claimed embodiments all
later-arising, patentable or unpatentable substituted technologies. These limits also prevented
pioneering invention patents from claiming or having their claims apply to later-arising, substituted
technologies that the inventor had not invented, disclosed, or enabled.”).
149. See authorities cited supra notes 27–30, 127–133 and accompanying text.
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purposes. 150 Temporally expanding literal claim scope will duplicate the
function of the doctrine of equivalents in protecting after-arising
technologies, and thereby further complicate claim construction. 151 It will
also require determining whether such temporally expanding claim scope
not conceived by the inventor constitutes patent eligible subject matter 152
or otherwise is permissibly claimed. 153
V. CONCLUSION
Recognizing that current law does not permit structural claim term
scope for literal infringement to encompass after-arising technologies will
have substantial implications. In contrast, current law interpreting
§ 112(f) treats functional claim term scope as limited to equivalents
known as of the filing date.
As I stated many years ago, echoing the concerns noted by Judge
Miller in his concurring opinion in In re Hogan 154:
[t]he 1952 Patent Act . . . should be interpreted to have authorized, but
not to have required, application of functional claims for improvement
150. See authority cited supra note 12 and accompanying text. Cf. Stephens, supra note 14, at 5
(“[A]s Kitchin LJ put it in Smith & Nephew v. Convatec, [[2015] EWCA Civ 607] ‘the scope of
any . . . claim must be exactly the same whether one is considering infringement or validity.’”).
151. Cf. Stephens, supra note 14, at 4–5 (discussing two recent U.K. cases applying the new
Actavis standard that found the accused technologies to fall within a purposive construction, but if
they had not done so then they should not be considered equivalents even though they achieved the
same function).
152. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 117 (15 How. 1853) (“Professor Morse has not
discovered, that the electric or galvanic current will always print at a distance, no matter what may be
the form of the machinery or mechanical contrivances through which it passes.”); Risdon Iron &
Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1895) (“That certain processes of manufacture
are patentable is as clear as that certain others are not, but nowhere is the distinction between them
accurately defined. There is somewhat of the same obscurity in the line of demarkation . . . between
a new article of manufacture, which is universally held to be patentable, and the function of a machine,
which it is equally clear is not. It may be said in general that processes of manufacture which involve
chemical or other similar elemental action are patentable, though mechanism may be necessary in the
application or carrying out of such process, while those which consist solely in the operation of a
machine are not. . . . But, if the operation of his device be purely mechanical, no such considerations
apply, since the function of the machine is entirely independent of any chemical or other similar
action.”).
153. See, e.g., Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 256–58 (1928) (“But
an inventor may not describe a particular starch glue which will perform the function of animal glue
and then claim all starch glues which have those functions, or even all starch glues made with three
parts of water and alkali, since starch glues may be made with three parts of water and alkali that do
not have those properties. . . . [T]he attempt to broaden product claims by describing the product
exclusively in terms of its use or function is subject to the same vice as is the attempt to describe a
patentable device or machine in terms of its function. As a description of the invention, it is
insufficient, and, if allowed, would extend the monopoly beyond the invention.”) (emphasis added).
154. See authorities cited supra note 22.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/1

36

Sarnoff: Correcting Misunderstandings

2019]

CORRECTING MISUNDERSTANDINGS

803

inventions to later-arising equivalent technologies. Nothing in the
language adopted by Congress reflects an intent to freeze judicial
interpretation regarding the permissible scope of future embodiments
that can be claimed using such functional language. To the extent that
the courts decide to apply functional claims for improvement inventions
to later-arising substituted technologies, however, they will have to
contend with two hundred years of patent claim scope doctrines and with
the Constitutional mandate to promote progress. 155

It also should be apparent that changing the law of literal
infringement to explicitly permit structural and functional claim terms to
encompass after-arising technologies would have dramatic consequences.
It should be authorized only with the greatest of care and subjected to
articulated limits. 156 And it should be done only after substantial further
analysis of the likely consequences and further evaluations of the
continued validity and scope of the pioneering invention patent doctrine
and its relationship to eligible subject matter, claim construction, and the
doctrine of equivalents principles. 157

155. Sarnoff, DOE Part II, supra note 20, at 491.
156. Cf. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843, 848 (1990) (“[C]ontrary to what Kitch suggests, we do not presume
that granting broad scope to an initial inventor induces more effective development and future
invention. We regard this as an open question . . . . Theoretical argument alone, however, cannot
resolve the question of whether technical advance proceeds more vigorously and effectively under
competition or under a regime where one person or organization has a considerable amount of control
over developments . . . . It is difficult to resolve issues like these when a patent is filed; at that point,
no one knows what future developments will follow or how difficult it will be to achieve them. Thus,
there is an argument for granting a broad set of claims for pioneering inventions. . . . But surely one
can go too far.”).
157. Cf. Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope:
A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 2003–04 (2005) (“Despite a
solid theoretical basis for giving pioneers generous protection against literal infringement, it is not
immediately clear that the high social value of pioneer inventions justifies special treatment under the
DOE. If not for frictions, pioneers could get appropriately broad scope by relying on the claim
language in their patents. In the absence of frictions that constrain claim scope, more generous
treatment of pioneers under the DOE would over-reward pioneers and possibly stifle cumulative
innovation. . . . Not surprisingly, we suggest that refinement costs, rather than frictions, may be larger
for pioneers. In particular, we conjecture that many pioneer inventors face a tougher problem of
visualizing and enumerating the many possible methods of imitating a pioneer invention.”).
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